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Genetic Nature/Culture explores the relationship between anthropology and genetics in the cur-
rent age of geneticization. The book is divided into four parts. The ﬁrst considers the formation of
knowledge about human genetics and the ways in which people are recruited (or forced) into
networks of knowledge creation. The second part focuses on animals and their role in making
knowledge. The third part looks at how groups of people redeﬁne knowledge to ﬁt their culture.
The fourth part examines the genetics of race. A major theme running throughout is ethics: in
genetics, in anthropology, and more generally in the power relationships surrounding knowledge.
As such, the book speaks more directly to science studies professionals than to historians
of science. However, some of the issues surrounding the genetics of today also apply to the
genetics – and more widely to the science – of the past. The book therefore provides ideas for
writing non-standard histories of science that address present concerns.
The opening essays use historical cases to investigate the ethics of using people to create
knowledge. The ﬁrst tells the story of the major human population-genetics project that James
Neel conducted during the 1960s and 1970s. In the second, Susan Lindee discusses how Victor
McKusick recruited Amish people into a network of informants about the health of community
members. Her essay can be proﬁtably compared with that of Donna Haraway, in the second part,
on dogs. Haraway shows that animal fanciers have collected information about inheritance
which geneticists have neither the inclination nor the means to collect. At the same time, as she
reveals, fanciers have had to enrol scientists to turn their information into knowledge. When
Haraway’s analysis is considered alongside Lindee’s story of a geneticist recruiting people to gain
information, it appears that only geneticists can create genetic knowledge, but that they often use
information gained from others to do so.
Another interesting comparison between these two essays concerns the question of audience, of
whom the knowledge was created for – a second theme that runs throughout the book. Lindee
points out that while McKusick took advantage of the Amish’s interest in health issues, the results
of his research were not intended for Amish eyes; similarly, Haraway shows that many fanciers
did not want to recognize their stock as diseased. In the book’s animal-oriented second part,
Haraway’s essay is placed alongside those of Sarah Franklin and Jonathan Marks. While Har-
away considers animal genetics in connection with fancying, Franklin looks at that science in the
context of agriculture, and Marks in the context of comparative anthropology. None of these
contexts have received much consideration by historians of genetics. The general lesson I drew
from these essays was that historians need to pay more attention to the roles that non-geneticists
have played in creating genetic knowledge. We have begun to investigate the people and animals
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anthropologists have contributed.
Where the ﬁrst half of the book deals with knowledge creation, the second half turns to the
meanings given to knowledge and the uses to which it is put. In the third part, the focus is on
cultural meanings among traditionally opressed groups. For example, Chaia Heller and Arturo
Escobar look at how the people of the Paciﬁc rainforest have reinterpreted biodiversity to include
diﬀerent ways of living, in order to preserve their land (and other) rights. Joan Fujimura and
Himla Soodyall’s essays go further, arguing that cultural meanings can be the reason for knowl-
edge formation. In Fujimura’s example, Japanese scientists believe that the results of genetics are
more compatible with Eastern culture than Western. In Soodyall’s case, the very act of doing
anthropological genetics in South Africa is seen to restore a sense of pride to the South African
people.
The ﬁnal essays, on race, looks at the question of whom knowledge serves and the surrounding
social, ethical and legal issues. We learn, for example, that though studies of disease in African
Americans might be supposed to beneﬁt the health care of that group, its social situation means
that its members tend to lack access to health care, so that being deﬁned as high risk for certain
diseases in fact threatens access to health insurance and employment. In Troy Duster’s
contribution, he argues that, while we can disprove the existence of biological races, denying their
social existence amounts to denying racial discrimination.
Despite historians’ protestations that science must be studied because it aﬀects many aspects
of everyday life, the use and meanings surrounding genetic knowledge have so far been little
examined. This book is not a history of genetics, anthropology or other sciences. However, in
discussing genetics from a wide range of perspectives (anthropological, methodological, ethical),
it suggests that perhaps historians should broaden their view of genetics, from one concentrating
on a single scientiﬁc discipline, to one which encompasses the multiple and diverse inﬂuences of
genetics on individuals’ lives.
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